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THE SEASAT FAILURE
REPORT OF THE SEASAT FAILURE REVIEW BOARD
by the NASA Investigation Board
The Seasat spacecraft failed on October 9,
1978, after satisfactory operation in orbit for
105 days, as a result of a loss of electrical
power in the Agena bus that was used as a
part of the spacecraft. The loss of power was
caused by a massive and progressive short in
one of the slip ring assemblies that was used
to connect the rotating solar arrays into the
power subsystem. The most likely cause of
this short was the initiation of an arc be-
tween adjacent slip ring brush assemblies.
The triggering mechanism of this arc could
have been either a wire-to-brush assembly
contact, a brush-to-brush contact, or a mo-
mentary short caused by a contaminant that
bridged internal components of opposite elec-
trical polarity.
The slip ring assembly, as used in the
Seasat spacecraft, was connected into the
power subsystem in such a way that most of
the adjacent brush assemblies were of oppo-
site electrical polarity. This wiring arrange-
ment, together with the congested nature of
the design itself, made the Seasat slip ring
assembly a unique, first-of-a-kind component
that was particularly prone to shorting.
The possibility of slip ring failures result-
ing from placing opposite electrical polarities
on adjacent brush assemblies was known at
least as early as the summer of 1977 to other
projects within the contractor's organization.
Furthermore, failures of slip ring assemblies
due to shorting between brushes had been
experienced by the prime contractor on the
slip ring assemblies used by other programs.
That the Seasat organization was not fully
aware of these potential failure modes was
due to a breakdown in communication within
the contractor's organization.
In addition to this small, though fatal,
breakdown in communications, the failure to
give the slip ring assembly the attention it
deserved was due, in large part, to an under-
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lying program policy and a pervasive view
that Seasat's Agena bus was a standard,
well-proven piece of equipment that had
been used on other programs. In actuality,
however, three major subsystems--the elec-
trical power subsystem, the attitude control
subsystem, and the data subsystem--were
substantially modified for use on Seasat's
Agena bus. So firmly rooted was this princi-
ple of using a "standard Agena bus" that,
even after the engineering staffs of both the
government and the contractor were well
aware of the final uniqueness of their bus,
the words, and the associated way of doing
business, persisted to the end.
The point of view that the Seasat bus was
flight proven, standard equipment proved to
have far-reaching consequences. It became
program policy to minimize testing and docu-
mentation, to qualify components by similar-
ity wherever possible, and to minimize the
penetration into the Agena bus by the gov-
ernment. It led to a concentration by project
management of the sensors, sensor integra-
tion, and the data management system to the
near exclusion of the bus subsystems. Impor-
tant component failures were not reported to
project management, a test was waived with-
out proper approval, and compliance with
specifications was weak. The component that
failed--the slip ring assembly--was never
mentioned in the briefing charts for either
the Consent to Ship meeting or the Critical
Design Review.
The Failure Modes, Effects and Critical-
ity Analysis that was conducted for the elec-
trical power subsystem did not consider
shorts as a failure mode and thus did not re-
veal the presence of single point failure
modes in the system or provide a basis for the
development of a full complement of sating
command sequences that could be used by
the flight controllers in responding to
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anomalies in the power subsystem. A lack of
clarity and rigor in the operating require-
ments and constraints documents for the
power subsystem of the bus, together with
this lack of safing command sequences, pre-
vented the flight controllers from having all
the tools they needed to do their job. The
flight controller for the power subsystem was
also new to his job at the time of the failure
and thus was not sufficiently knowledgeable
of the system he was controlling. While no
action of the flight controllers contributed to
the failure, they did fail to follow the pre-
scribed procedures in response to the infor-
mation available to them at the time of the
failure.
The advantages of using standard, well
proven equipment in terms of both cost and
mission success are well recognized. But the
experience of Seasat illustrates the risks that
are associated with the use of equipment that
is classified as "standard" or "flight proven."
The uncritical acceptance of such classifica-
tions by the Seasat engineering staff sub-
merged important differences in both design
and application from previously used equip-
ment. It is therefore important that thorough
planning be conducted at the start of a
project to fully evaluate the heritage of pre-
viously used equipment and to establish
project plans and procedures that enable the
system to be selectively penetrated.
THE SEASAT MISSION AND ITS
SPACECRAFT
The Seasat Project was a proof-of-concept
mission whose objectives included demon-
stration of techniques for global monitoring
of oceanographic and surface meteorological
phenomena and features, provision of
oceanographic data for both application and
scientific areas, and the determination of key
features of an operational ocean dynamics
monitoring system.
To fulfill these objectives, the Seasat sen-
sor complement comprised a radar altimeter
(ALT), a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), a
Seasat-A scatterometer system (SASS), a
scanning multichannel microwave radiome-
ter (SMMR), and a visual and infrared radi-
ometer (VIRR). All of these sensors except
the SAR operated continuously; telemetry
from them, as well as from all engineering
subsystems, was sent in real-time when over
a ground station and recorded on a tape re-
corder for later transmission to provide data
for a full orbit. SAR data had to be transmit-
ted in real-time, without the use of the on-
board recorder, to specially equipped stations
because of its high data rate. The normal
duty cycle for the SAR was four percent.
The five sensors were integrated into a
sensor module that provided mounting, ther-
mal control, power conditioning, telemetry,
and command support to the instruments.
The second major element of the spacecraft
was an Agena bus which provided attitude
control, electrical power, telemetry and com-
mand functions to the sensor module. In ad-
dition to these on-orbit functions, the Agena
bus also provided injection stage propulsion
and guidance to orbit. The spacecraft was
three-axis stabilized with all sensors Earth
pointing and is shown in its on-orbit configu-
ration in Figure 1. To provide near global
coverage, the spacecraft was injected into a
790 kilometer, near circular orbit with an
inclination of 108 degrees and a period of ap-
proximately 101 minutes. Design lifetime
was one year on orbit, with expendables pro-
vided for a three-year life.
The sensors were provided by various
NASA Centers. The sensor module, the Age-
na bus and the integration of the sensors,
sensor module and Agena bus into a space-
craft was provided by the Lockheed Missles
and Space Company under contract to the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
Responsibility for Seasat project manage-
ment, mission planning and direction, mis-
sion operations and experiment data process-
ing resided at JPL. The Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) provided network
support and spacecraft orbit and attitude de-
terminations; use was therefore made of the
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existing Spaceflight Tracking and Data
Network, the NASA Communications (NAS-
COM) network, and the Project Operations
Control Center that are operated by GSFC.
To place this failure review in a proper
perspective, it is noted that the Seasat space-
craft operated in orbit in a general]y satisfac-
tory maneuver for over three months and
provided a large amount of scientific data.
The sensors represented a significant ad-
vance in technology and their integration
into the sensor module, a large engineering
challenge. In addition, Seasat also required
the creation of significantly enlarged capa-
bilities in the acquisition and processing of
flight data. That the important and signifi-
cant technical and engineering advance-
ments were achieved is a tribute to the skill
and dedication of all who were associated
with this program.
The Seasat spacecraft was successfully
launched on June 26, 1978, and thus operat-
ed for 105 days until the failure occurred on
October 9, 1978. During this time in orbit,
the spacecraft operation was generally satis-
factory with considerable data being ob-
tained from all of the sensors. Three signifi-
cant anomalies were experienced during the
life of Seasat in orbit, one involving sun in-
terference in the attitude control system scan
wheels, one caused by a sticking thermostat
in a sensor heater circuit, and one in which
the spacecraft suffered an abnormally low
bus voltage for several orbits. Because of a
possible relationship of these latter two
anomalies with the failure of October 9,
1978, they were specifically investigated by
the Board.
PROGRAM HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT
The Seasat program was conceived and
initiated in a period of transition in the
philosophy of management of NASA pro-
grams following the Apollo program. Apollo,
and to varying degrees other NASA flight
programs, were characterized by extensive
test programs, large formal documentation
systems, and comprehensive and frequent
technical and management reviews. A large
in-house staff was required in order to imple-
ment this approach. The high cost of conduct-
ing space programs in this mode severely
constrained the future uses of space. During
the final phases of the Apollo program,
NASA management accordingly instituted a
policy aimed at reducing the cost space mis-
sions. This policy was aggressively pursued
by the highest levels of management.
A Low Cost Systems Office was estab-
lished in Headquarters to oversee a stan-
dardization program and to encourage the
use of existing hardware. This program in-
cluded the development of standard compo-
nents as we]] as a multimission spacecraft.
A major emphasis was placed on shifting
work from in-house to out-of-house in consid-
eration of reducing the NASA manpower
base. Design-to-cost techniques and cost
benefits of heritage through the use of hard-
ware and software developed for other pro-
grams were subjects to be addressed at each
step in the approval cycle.
The basic philosophy of the Seasat pro-
gram was thus established in an environ-
ment in which management emphasis was
shifting from one of demonstrating a nation-
al capability to operate reliably in space to
one of reducing the cost of utilizing space.
Design-to-cost was a fundamental tenet of
the Seasat project definition. A cost estimate
of $58.2 million was established as a target
cost at the end of the feasibility study phase
in mid-1973 and was imposed as a design-to-
cost ceiling in December 1973 by NASA
management. Any overruns were to be offset
by descoping the mission content.
In attempting to define a program which
would both satisfy the user community and
live within the ceiling cost, the concept of
making maximum use of proven existing
hardware and software was adopted early in
the program planning phase. This in turn
provided for a reduction in design and devel-
opment effort and in the size of the in-house
staff needed to monitor the activity.
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Figure 1 On-Orbit Configuration of the Seasat Spacecraft
These were key elements of the manage-
ment philosophy which influenced the struc-
ture and conduct of the program.
PROGRAM PLANNING
Feasibility Studies (Phase A) - Feasi-
bility for the Seasat mission was established
in '73 through three studies conducted by the
JPL, GSFC, and the Applied Physics Labora-
tory of the Johns Hopkins University. These
studies were aimed at meeting the set of user
requirements generated at a series of meet-
ings held in the first half of 1973 among
NASA and representatives of the govern-
mental, commercial, and institutional com-
munities of users of ocean dynamics data.
With the user requirements as a basis, the
feasibility studies examined the Seasat mis-
sion from an overall systems viewpoint, in-
cluding a review of instrumentation and pos-
sible spacecraft (bus) approaches to accom-
modate the instrumentation.
Subsequent to the submission of the
Phase A studies in July 1973, a joint
NASA/User Study Task Team was formed to
review the Phase A studies, integrate the
results, and provide technical and program-
matic guidance for more in-depth Definition
Phase studies.
As a result of this review, the Task Team
recommended a Baseline Mission which in-
cluded a complement of the five sensor types
that actually ended up flying on Seasat.
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Based upon cost estimates prepared by
the Phase A study participants, the Task
Team recommended a target cost of $58.2
million for the Baseline Mission. This includ-
ed the cost of the spacecraft bus and instru-
ments, the launch vehicles, and tracking and
data acquisition. An Alternate Payload Mis-
sion of reduced capability, excluding the syn-
thetic aperture radar, was also recommended
for further study with a target cost of $43.2
million.
There was some discussion in the Seasat
Study Study Task Team Report (October
1973) of the use of an existing bus to mini-
mize cost. The idea, however, was addressed
with some skepticism. While it was believed
that the use of subsystems with a high de-
gree of inheritance from existing programs
was desirable and possible, it was not clear at
that time that an existing bus could be
adapted economically.
Definition Studies and Preliminary
Design (Phase B) - Definition Phase Studies
of the Baseline and Alternate Payload Mis-
sions recommended by the Seasat Study
Task Team were conducted from November
1973 to the summer of 1974. The Wallops
Flight Center managed the Definition Phase
Study of the Baseline Mission which was con-
ducted by the Applied Physics Laboratory.
The JPL, assisted by various aerospace com-
panies familiar with Earth satellite design,
conducted the Definition Phase Study of the
Alternate Mission.
In December 1973, NASA management
adopted the $58.2 million figure recommend-
ed by the Task Team as a not to exceed ceiling
for the Seasat Baseline Mission. The efforts
of the Definition Phase Study participants
were accordingly intensified to develop the
most economical satellite system possible
that would best suit the user requirements
within the cost ceiling.
GSFC declined to participate in the Defi-
nition Phase activity as they had serious
doubts as to their ability to structure a full
Baseline Mission within the design-to-cost
ceiling.
With the stimulus of the design-to-cost
ceiling, and management emphasis on the
maximum use of existing subsystem hard-
ware, the JPL Definition Phase Group pro-
posed the of idea building a spacecraft sys-
tem comprising two major elements: a sensor
module designed specifically for Seasat, and
a spacecraft bus based on an existing, flight
proven bus devloped for other Air Force or
NASA programs. The JPL viewed the results
of the Phase A studies as indicating that the
requirements of the sensors could be satisfied
by standard support subsystems for attitude
control, power, structures, thermal control,
etc. On the other hand, the area of greatest
uncertainty was seen to be the definition of
the sensor's operating capabilities, data re-
quirements and sensor system integration. It
was therefore proposed that if a suitable
spacecraft bus were available, the design and
development effort could be concentrated on
the sensors and their integration with a sen-
sor module that could then be mated to the
bus via a mechanical/electrical interface.
The JPL entered into four $15,000 study
contracts with aerospace companies (Boeing,
General Electric, Lockheed, and TRW) that
had existing spacecraft designs with capabil-
ities in the range of Seasat requirements to
evaluate the concepts that: (1) there are ex-
isting buses that could be used, without
modification, to supply the necessary support
functions for the sensor payload, and (2) new
design functions could be incorporated in a
separate module along with the sensors and
thereby reduce the systems development
task to a sensor system development task.
The studies were conducted from November
15, 1973 to March 30, 1974. The sensors were
described to the study contractors as they
were developed on December 15, 1973, with
updates as appropriate until the end of these
studies.
It was concluded as a result of these stud-
ies that basic sensor support requirements
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could be satisfied by the existing spacecraft
bus designs studied with "no major changes,"
although "minor modifications" were ac-
knowledged to be required. It was contem-
plated, for example, that minor modifications
would be required of the attitude control,
power, and temperature control subsystems.
Telemetry, tracking and command subsys-
tems were reported to be off-the-shelf de-
signs, but required significant modification.
It should be noted that the contractor bus
studies were concerned almost solely with
mission performance requirements. The re-
ports did not sufficiently define the sub-
system design or component selections to
provide a basis for an adequate penetration
of heritage. The JPL Definition Phase Final
Report nevertheless concluded that the exist-
ing bus approach had significant cost, sched-
ule and risk advantages, and permitted a
concentration of development efforts on the
sensor system.
Midterm reports in May 1974 of the JPL
and the Wallops Flight Center and Applied
Physics Laboratory Definition Phase study
groups demonstrated that neither the Base-
line nor Alternate Payload Mission was
achievable within the $58.2 million ceiling.
The Wallops Flight Center and Applied
Physics Laboratory's estimate for the Base-
line Mission, which included an in-house de-
signed spacecraft, was $85.2 million. At this
point in time the Wallops Flight Center and
the Applied Physics Laboratory adopted the
sensor module/existing bus concept that JPL
was pursuing. JPL's midterm estimate for
the Alternate Payload Mission using the ex-
isting bus concept was $65.9 million.
The JPL and the Wallops Flight Center
and Applied Physics Laboratory searched for
ways to descope the project in order to stay
within the cost ceiling. Each group per-
formed a number of iterations wherein sen-
sor performance and sensor combinations
were varied in order to decrease the cost and
yet meet the basic user requirements.
A final presentation of the JPL and
Wallops Flight Center and Applied Physics
Laboratory's Definition Phase studies to
NASA Headquarters management in August
1974 resulted in a reduced baseline payload
at the $58.2 million ceiling which eliminated
the microwave radiometer and combined the
altimeter and scatterometer into a single in-
strument, but which retained the synthetic
aperture radar, as well as the visual and in-
frared radiometer.
SPACECRAFT REQUIREMENTS AND
DOCUMENTATION
The two primary contractual documents on
Seasat were the Satellite Vehicle Specifica-
tion (Part I and Part II) and the Satellite Ve-
hicle System Test Plan. There were 13 other
documents which required JPL approval, but
these were primarily implementation and
operations type plans; i.e., Data Manage-
ment Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, etc. One
of these plans, the Reliability Assurance
Plan, is relevant to this chapter and will be
discussed herein.
Part I of the Satellite Vehicle Specifica-
tion established the performance, design, de-
velopment, and qualification requirements
for the Seasat mission. Part II of the specifi-
cation established the product configuration
and system test acceptance requirements.
This specification is similar to a typical Part
I, Part II Contract End Item specification
used for most NASA programs.
The Satellite Vehicle Systems Test Plan
established the test program for assembling,
testing, monitoring and operating the Seasat
spacecraft from manufacturing through
launch. The Satellite Vehicle Systems in-
cluded all Lockheed and government fur-
nished hardware installed in the Agena bus
assembly and the sensor module. The test
plan was the controlling test document and
subordinate only to the Satellite Vehicle
Specification. An evaluation was made re-
garding this flow of requirements and the in-
terrelationships of Lockheed and JPL rela-
tive to control and the visibility of require-
ments.
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Compliance with Requirements - Dur-
ing the Board's review, it was determined
that a significant test required by the JPL
approved test plan was not conducted. The
Satellite Vehicle Test Plan required elec-
tronic assemblies to be subjected to eight
cycles in thermal environment of which, as a
minimum, two cycles should be in a vacuum
chamber (acceptance test). The Slip Ring
Assembly Component Specification, howev-
er, did not require a thermal vacuum test.
This noncompliance was not recognized by
JPL or Lockheed systems engineering until
the present failure investigation was begun.
Discussions with Lockheed and JPL person-
nel revealed that there was not a closed loop
system to assure compliance with contractu-
al requirements identified in the test plan.
The fact that a component specification
that violated a contractual requirement
could be issued is indicative of a lack of
checks and balances in the system. Another
indication of this lack surfaced in reviewing
the qualification requirements. In at least
two cases, to be discussed below, qualifica-
tion requirements noncompliance was not
documented. In fact, in the areas where the
Board performed an in-depth evaluation, in-
consistencies in requirements were noted in
many cases. Most inconsistencies were mi-
nor; however, the impression left was that
both compliance with requirements by Lock-
heed and the check and balance system at
Lockheed and JPL were deficient.
Engineering Memoranda - Environ-
mental derivations, test criteria and detailed
test requirements were documented in engi-
neering memoranda (EMs). Lockheed stated
that EMs were used to allow early genera-
tion of requirements while the spacecraft de-
sign was being finalized. A considerable
number of EMs were developed during the
course of the Seasat program, and it accord-
ingly became very difficult to establish a
documentation trail as to how test require-
ments were established, modified, and satis-
fied. In fact, two particular incidents were
uncovered during detailed evaluation into
the qualification status of the electrical pow-
er subsystem components that point out the
weakness of the EM system.
In one case, the Seasat environmental
requirements specified a five minute per axis
random vibration level but several compo-
nents were qualified by similarity to a pro-
gram that required only a three minute per
axis vibration. This five minute per axis
requirement was also specified in Part I of
the Satellite Vehicle Specification. There
was no documented evidence that this non-
compliance was acceptable. In the second in-
cident, pyro shock levels for Seasat were not
enveloped by the program to which the Sea-
sat slip ring assemblies were "qualified by
similarity." While an EM stated that the slip
ring assemblies are "not highly sensitive to
pyro shock," there was no documentation or
analysis to support the stated conclusion.
Because Seasat was a one-of-a-kind vehi-
cle, Lockheed did not summarize the require-
ments contained in the various EMs into a
single baseline document. A baseline docu-
ment, with change control, would have been
a systematic approach to assuring require-
ments were satisfied and would have pro-
vided a feedback mechanism to all parties.
The large number of EMs produced in the
Seasat program made it very difficult for
Lockheed to use the EMs to manage the
program and to assure continuity in require-
ments, as exemplified above, and equally
difficult for JPL to effectively penetrate the
system.
The Failure Modes, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) - The
FMECA prepared for Seasat utilized the
Fault Tree Analysis Technique. In effect,
this was a method for studying the factors
that could cause an undesired event to occur
and inputting these factors into a computer
model to which probability data could be
applied to determine the most critical and
probable sequence of events that could pro-
duce the undesirable event.
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The Reliability Assurance Program Plan
required that a FMECA be performed at the
system level. Further evaluation revealed
that "critical/new equipment" would also be
subjected to an FMECA. Out of the 74 criti-
cal items identified on Seasat, only three
were judged to require component level
FMECAs. These were the command timing
unit (CTU), the telemetry sensor unit (TSU)
and the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) an-
tenna (supplier performed).
The FMECA for the electrical power sub-
system stated that there were "no single
point failures" and listed a number of redun-
dancies, including main bus power supply
channels, batteries, charge controllers, and
others. Electrical shorts were, however, not
included as possible failure modes; almost all
of the effort was directed toward consider-
ation of failure modes that would result in
loss of solar array power, and the only slip
ring assembly failure mode considered was
"slip ring contact failure." The lack of consid-
eration of electrical shorts in effect prevented
the FMECA from serving as a tool for direct-
ing attention to those portions of the system
where electrical shorts could occur and led to
the erroneous conclusions that there were no
single point failure modes in the electrical
power subsystem.
Component Specifications - Compo-
nent specifications were used on Seasat to de-
fine the design, performance, acceptance,
and qualification requirements of the major
hardware items and subassemblies. Because
the program intent was to utilize as much
off-the-shelf hardware as possible, many ex-
isting specifications were redlined and up-
dated for the Seasat Agena bus. These red-
lined specifications were then converted into
component specifications by the responsible
equipment engineers. After April 1976, a
program directive established that all com-
ponent specifications on Seasat required the
signature approval of reliability engineer-
ing, of space technology, and of the chief sys-
tems engineer in addition to the responsible
equipment engineer and the program engi-
neer. Two specifications were released prior
to April 1976 and never received the full
complement of signature approvals. These
two specifications were for the Slip Ring As-
semblies and the Solar Array Drive Motors.
Had the other three engineering organiza-
tions reviewed the specifications, quite possi-
bly the Slip Ring Assembly thermal vacuum
test deletion may have been prevented and
inconsistencies in the qualification require-
ments may have been avoided. The compo-
nent specifications were not reviewed and
approved by JPL.
Qualification for Flight - The Seasat
program used the classical methods of quali-
fying hardware for flight. These were:
a) Qualification by test to demonstrate the
capability of an item to meet specification
requirements.
b) Qualification by design similarity where-
by an unqualified item is compared with
an item qualified by test to determine
whether the requirements for both items
and their configurations are sufficiently
similar to justify not testing the unquali-
fied item.
c) Qualification by engineering analysis, in-
dependently or in conjunction with test
and/or similarity, to meet a specific quali-
fication in the specifications. The use of
engineering analysis alone could not be
used to satisfy all qualification require-
ments.
In September 1976, the Lockheed Seasat pro-
ject issued a directive creating an Equipment
Qualification Review Board for the purpose
of reviewing and approving all qualification
and design similarity certificates. The pri-
mary membership of the board included the
program engineering managers, the chief
systems engineer, the program reliability en-
gineer, the quality assurance manager, and
the applicable space technology manager.
This Board met every two weeks to review
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the status of the qualification program and to
determine what additional tasks were re-
quired to qualify a given item. Status reports
were issued by program reliability engineer-
ing which tracked the qualification progress
and documented open items.
The qualification cycle concluded with a
meeting to review all test data, design simi-
larity statements, engineering analyses, and
individual component pedigree packages. In-
dividual Certificates of Qualification were is-
sued stating that the specific component had
been qualified to the intended environment
and was acceptable for flight. A JPL engi-
neering representative attended these quali-
fication review meetings but was not re-
quired to approve the qualification certif-
icate. A JPL reliability representative at-
tended approximately 25 percent of the re-
view meetings.
Review of Build Paper - An evaluation
of the Seasat "build" paper was made with
primary attention focused on the electrical
power subsystem. The review encompassed
the electrical harness fabrication and instal-
lation, the "pedigree packages" on electrical
components and assemblies, nonconformance
reports on anomalies encountered in assem-
bly and test, vehicle log books, and the vehi-
cle acceptance summary.
Because the Board's failure analysis
eventually identified the slip ring assembly
as the component responsible for the Seasat
failure, the detailed build paper associated
with only this component will be discussed in
the next section. However, some brief obser-
vations are presented below that deal with
other findings made during the course of the
investigation.
The nonconformance reports are used by
Lockheed to document nonconforming condi-
tions and resultant dispositions and correc-
tion actions. In general, the nonconformance
report system at Lockheed was found to be
acceptable. At the Board's request, Lockheed
reviewed, cataloged, and summarized all
electrical power subsystem nonconformance
reports and made a conscious decision as to
the possible effect of the anomaly in contri-
buting to the Seasat failure. None of the non-
conformances were judged to be contributory
to the failure.
Evaluation of the spacecraft build paper
of the electrical power subsystem indicated
that the Air Force Plant Representative Of-
fice involvement, operating under delegation
from JPL, was shallow. Inspection coverage
was concentrated at the system level with
few in-process mandatory inspection points.
Early negotiations surfaced the fact that
the Air Force Plant Representative Office
could provide neither the number of person-
nel nor the required skill levels to perform
electronic inspections. As a result of these
negotiations, JPL elected to send three JPL
inspectors on extended temporary duty to
perform 100 percent of the solder joint in-
spections and electronic component accep-
tance testing. While it cannot be stated that
a more in-depth involvement by the govern-
ment would have prevented the failure, it is
the opinion of the Board that the depth of
penetration was inappropriate and a more
selective penetration would have been in or-
der rather than a nearly total reliance on
system level audits and shakedown inspec-
tions for the bus assembly operations.
SLIP RING HERITAGE
Consistent with the basic philosophy of the
Seasat program to use, to the maximum ex-
tent possible, standard flight-proven equip-
ment, the solar array drive motors and slip
ring assemblies for Seasat were adapted from
another Lockheed program. At the time of
initial contract negotiations, this other Lock-
heed program had just developed a slip ring
assembly and was in the process of perform-
ing qualification testing. This slip ring was
also being considered for still other Lockheed
programs and it was anticipated that the as-
sembly would be a qualified and flight-
proven design by the time Seasat was flown.
As it turns out, however, the program for
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which the design was originally developed
was canceled after completion of slip ring
qualification but prior to flight; however, one
other Lockheed program did fly a slip ring
assembly of this design shortly before Seasat
was launched. While the designs of the slip
ring assembly for Seasat and this "previously
flown" program were identical, the wiring se-
quence of the individual rings and brushes
was different in the two programs. As noted
earlier, the Seasat slip rings were wired such
that most of the adjacent power brushes were
of opposite DC polarity while the other Lock-
heed program was wired such that the adja-
cent power brushes had the same polarity.
This difference in how the slip ring assem-
blies were connected into the electrical power
subsystem thus became crucial to the heri-
tage of the Seasat slip ring assembly; when
the Seasat slip ring assembly became, in its
application, connected in a manner that was
different from its sole predecessor it became
a unique, first of a kind component.
Two significant problems were noted as a
result of random vibration testing of the slip
ring assemblies used for the other Lockheed
flight program. An isolation failure was
found after vibration testing in two adjacent
brush/ring circuits. The corrective action was
to separate the brushes. Also, when the as-
sembly was opened for this operation, a crack
was noted in the brush mounting block at a
mounting hole. This block was replaced on
the failed unit and a "T" strengthener was
added to all identical slip ring assemblies, in-
cluding the Seasat units, to distribute the
mounting loads away from the mounting
point.
Failure History - Slip ring assemblies of
the design flown by Seasat experienced two
nonconformances that provide evidence of
two separate failure mode possibilities. One
of these was the isolation failure noted above
on the other Lockheed flight program that
was indicative of a possible failure mode due
to contact between adjacent brushes of oppo-
site polarity. Another failure mode identified
on one of the Seasat assemblies was caused
by shorting of a wire to ground due to cold
flow of the Teflon insulation in the region
where high stresses were imposed on the
wire. This incident will be described later.
Considerable evidence exists in published
reports that the sliding friction between
brushes and rings will generate debris parti-
cles that can accumulate and produce electri-
cal noise or, in some cases, short circuits be-
tween adjacent rings and brushes. Lockheed
experienced a shorting failure in a slip as-
sembly used in ground tests of a control mo-
ment gyro prior to June 1977, which was at-
tributed to accumulation of brush-generated
debris and subsequent arcing between adja-
cent power brushes. Discussion with engi-
neering personnel from TRW, Ball Corpora-
tion, and Sperry Flight Systems have indi-
cated that other aerospace contractors have
experienced similar slip ring shorts in
ground tests. As a result of their experience
with slip rings, Sperry initiated an experi-
mental study of the possible effects of debris.
While the Board recognizes that there are
significant differences between the design
and application of the Seasat slip ring assem-
bly and these other units, experience illus-
trates a third possible failure mode due to
shorting caused by contaminants or debris
within the assembly.
Seasat Slip Ring History - A portion of
the build history of components is assembled
by Lockheed into pedigree packages. These
packages contain component drawings, a
component specification including accep-
tance and qualification test requirements,
nonconformance reports, and some vendor
documentation including specified testing
and plans test records. Component selection
for pedigree packages was determined by the
Seasat Program Office and the quality assur-
ance organization at Lockheed. The Seasat
slip ring assemblies are documented by such
pedigree packages. Relevant component his-
tory not contained in the slip ring pedigree
packages include vendor assembly and test
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nonconformance reports (including failure
reports), assembly test procedures and
records (including brush alignments and
pressure checks and brush "run-in" proce-
dures), and relevant vendor and customer
correspondence.
The timing of the Seasat contract was
such that Lockheed was able to acquire two
partially assembled slip ring assemblies
when another Lockheed program referred to
herein as Program A, was canceled. Program
A had initially contracted for 10 assemblies
and, at the time of termination, had accepted
delivery of one qualification unit, one devel-
opment unit, and two production units leav-
ing six partially assembled units at the ven-
dor. The Seasat program picked up two of
these units and Lockheed Program B picked
up the additional units. Reference will be
made to Program B in other portions of this
report relative to test experience and use of
Program B qualification testing as a basis for
qualifying the Seasat slip rings by similar-
ity.
Program A personnel were informed by
Poly-Scientific in late 1973 that the con-
straints placed upon the length of the assem-
bly were found to be restrictive and that re-
lief of the specifications would enhance reli-
ability. Program A, however, could not relax
the specification. Although the Seasat appli-
cation was not constrained by length, the
program desire to use available off-the-shelf
hardware precluded the development of a
new unit having increased dimensional tol-
erances between the rings and brush assem-
blies with possibly enhanced inherent reli-
ability.
Seasat personnel initiated discussions
with Poly-Scientific in late 1975 using the
Lockheed Program A specification as a base-
line. On February 3, 1976, Poly-Scientific
submitted its first written quote for two as-
semblies to be fabricated and tested per the
Program A specification. This initial quote
was not acceptable to Lockheed, and the re-
sponsible equipment engineer and buyer re-
sponded on March 5, 1976, with a Seasat red-
lined version of the Program A specification.
It was in this March 5, 1976, specification
that the Program A requirement for 10 cy-
cles of thermal vacuum acceptance testing
was deleted. This deletion occurred even
though: (1) the majority of the Seasat elec-
tronic assemblies and electromechanical as-
semblies were subjected to a thermal vacuum
acceptance test; (2) Seasat reliability and
systems engineering personnel, and JPL per-
sonnel were unaware of this deletion until
the present failure investigation; and (3) the
thermal vacuum test was contractually re-
quired and a waiver of the requirement was
never issued
Upon pursuing the thermal vacuum dele-
tion further, it was determined from inter-
views with involved personnel that the test
was deleted during verbal negotiations be-
tween both the responsible equipment engi-
neer and the buyer at Lockheed, and the ven-
dor in order to reduce unit cost of the slip
ring assemblies. The responsible Lockheed
program engineer approved the deletion but,
at that time, there was no requirement to co-
ordinate specifications with the Seasat pro-
gram reliability engineer or the chief sys-
tems engineer. The fact that a waiver was
not issued on this and other contract noncom-
pliances is indicative of a weak compliance
system between Lockheed and JPL.
On March 25, 1976, Lockheed issued a
formal Request for Quote to Poly-Scientific
for two Seasat slip ring assemblies built to
the March 5, 1976 specification with a re-
quested delivery date of one year. On May
26, 1976, Lockheed authorized contract go
ahead for two slip ring assemblies at a unit
price of $8,953.50.
Researching the manufacturing history
and fabrication and test anomalies at Poly-
Scientific resulted in the following:
a) There were four anomalies noted on slip
ring unit 1001. Three were minor and ap-
pear to have had no real impact on assem-
bly reliability. The fourth anomaly was a
Teflon wire short to an adjacent ground
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b)
c)
lug. The repair action, approved by Lock-
heed engineering, was to insulate the
ground terminal and repot with ES 222-2
cement. The damaged insulation on the
wire was not repaired. This discrepancy
report was not included in the vendor's
data package and consequently this fail-
ure was not contained in the Lockheed
pedigree package.
Slip Ring Unit 1002 (-Y solar array) had
the more significant anomalies noted dur-
ing fabrication and test. These anomalies
are summarized as follows:
1) 9/20/76 - 80 minute run-in of brushes
to rings at 100 ± 10 rpm. Run-in time
should have been for 100 to 115 min-
utes. This discrepancy was missed and
not documented.
2) 9/23/76 - discrepancy No. 146522 - dis-
colored rings noted after above run-in
test. Unit had to be completely disas-
sembled, brushes and rings recleaned,
unit reassembled and another run-in
performed. The exact run-in time was
no'_ recorded nor entered into the log
book.
3) 11/12/76 - discrepancy No. 151887 - ex-
cessive noise noted caused by moisture
pick-up in the brush material. Correc-
tive action was to run the unit in vacu-
um at 14.4 rpm for 1½ hours. No vacu-
um cleanup was performed after this
14.4 rpm run-in test. This run time
was not entered into the log book.
Review of vendor documentation and sub-
sequent teleconferences with Poly-
Scientific personnel revealed the follow-
ing assembly technique and procedures:
1) The assembly planning documenta-
tion specified that the brushes were to
be aligned "in center of the rings."
This requirement was verified visual-
ly by the inspector, but no dimensional
checks were made. Proper alignment
of the brushes is dependent, therefore,
on the inspector's judgment.
2) Poly-Scientific stated that the toler-
ances within the slip ring assembly
could allow adjacent brushes to touch.
It is noted here that an identical slip
ring assembly experienced an isola-
tion failure during acceptance testing
which was probably caused by adja-
cent brushes touching. (Program B
hardware).
Both Seasat slip ring assemblies were
shipped from Poly-Scientific on February 22,
1977. These units were received and accepted
at Lockheed on March 11, 1977, where they
remained in storage until required for instal-
lation on their respective solar array mod-
ules.
In approximately July 1977, Lockheed
Program B, which utilized identical slip ring
assemblies, made a wiring change external
to the slip rings that separated the polarity
arrangement of adjacent slip rings. By
changing connector pin functions, the power
applied to individual rings was changed from
a configuration in which adjacent rings were
of opposite polarity to one having positive
contacts on one end of the slip ring assembly
and negative contacts on the opposite end.
This wiring change significantly reduced the
possibility of internal shorts within the slip
ring assembly.
The Seasat chief system engineer was
contacted by a system engineer from Pro-
gram B about this change in wiring in Au-
gust 1977. The explanation given for the wir-
ing change was a concern that the ascent vi-
bration environment could cause adjacent
brushes to make contact and thus produce an
electrical short because Program B slip rings
had power applied during launch. The chief
system engineer discussed this change with
the Seasat program engineer and they decid-
ed not to make a similar wiring change be-
cause Seasat did not see the same launch vi-
bration levels and because Seasat slip rings
were not planned to be powered during
launch. It is noted that in April 1978, a
change in launch relay configuration was
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made which did apply power to the slip ring
assemblies. In retrospect, the decision not to
change the wiring sequence for Seasat was a
crucial one. When the other program
changed its wiring and Seasat did not, Seasat
became the first program to fly a 52-brush
slip ring assembly with adjacent brushes of
opposite polarity. Had there been better visi-
bility to the problems experienced with slip
rings by both the vendor and by other organi-
zations within Lockheed, the Seasat engi-
neering managers may have been more sen-
sitive to the failure prone nature of this com-
plicated device and to the importance of the
electrical polarity of adjacent brushes. Un-
fortunately, such visibility, which may only
have needed to have been slight to have been
effective, was lacking.
Slip Ring Assembly serial number 1002
was installed on the -Y solar array module on
August 17, 1977. On August 30, 1977, a non-
conformance report was written because the
mechanic "lost" an undetermined number of
shim washers.
Review of the installation drawing re-
vealed that four number 10 washers were re-
quired between the solar array mounting
structure and the slip ring assembly. The
cover of the assembly is made of thin sheet
metal and is prone to bow up during installa-
tion operations. Because the mounting bolts
go through the cover plate into the threaded
holes in the slip ring body, the mechanic had
to place the round washers over the bolts be-
tween the structure and the cover plate. It
was during this operation that the mechanic
lost the washers. The S/N 1002 slip ring as-
sembly was removed from the solar array
module, the cover plate removed and three
washers were found. Because some areas
were still obscured, an x-ray of the slip ring
was taken. No additional washers were locat-
ed. A nonconformance report was then writ-
ten against Slip Ring Assembly 1001 and no
washers were found by either visual or x-ray
inspection. It is interesting to note two
things: (1) there were no downstream electri-
cal functional checks after installation of the
slip ring assembly which could have detected
missing washers in the slip rings, and (2) it
was never conclusively determined if all lost
washers were found.
The solar array modules, including the
slip ring assemblies, were shipped to the
launch site in April 1978. The last reported
anomaly on the slip rings was high contact
resistance on unit 1002 during interface tests
performed when the solar array modules
were mated to the vehicle. The resistance
reading recorded was 2.38 ohms; the specifi-
cation value was 2.00 ohms maximum. The
engineering disposition in the nonconfor-
mance report was "use-as-is" because in-
flight operation would decrease the contact
resistance.
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1) The spacecraft failure that occurred on
October 9, 1978, was due to a loss of elec-
trical power in the Agena bus as a result
of a massive and progressive electrical
short within the slip ring assembly of the
-Y solar array.
2) The electrical short was most probably
initiated by an arc between adjacent com-
ponents in the slip ring assembly. Possi-
ble triggering mechanisms for this arc are
momentary shorts caused by wire-to-
brush assembly contact, brush-to-brush
contact, or by a contaminant.
3) The congested nature of the slip ring de-
sign, coupled with a wiring arrangement
for connecting the slip rings into the pow-
er subsystem that resulted in most of the
adjacent brush assemblies being of oppo-
site polarity, made the Seasat slip ring as-
sembly particularly prone to shorting.
4) The combination of design and wiring se-
quence used for the Seasat slip ring as-
semblies made these unique, first-of-a-
kind components.
5) The possibility of slip ring failures result-
ing from placing opposite electrical po-
larities on adjacent brush assemblies was
known at least as early as the summer
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1977 to other projects within the prime
contractor's organization. That the Seasat
organization was not fully aware of these
potential failure modes was due to a
breakdown in communications within the
contractor's organization.
6) The failure to recognize the potential fail-
ure modes of the slip ring assembly and to
give this critical component the attention
it deserved was due, in part, to the under-
lying program policy and pervasive view
that it was an existing component of a
well-proven and extensively used stan-
dard Agena bus. This program policy fur-
ther led to a concentration by project
management on the sensors and sensor
module of the spacecraft to the near ex-
clusion of the bus subsystems. In actual-
ity, many of these subsystems, including
the power subsystem, contained compo-
nents that were neither flight proven nor
truly qualified by similarity.
7) Lack of proper attention by both Lock-
heed and JPL Seasat program engineer-
ing to the new and unproven components
on the Agena bus resulted in several in-
stances of both noncompliance with con-
tractual, qualification and acceptance re-
quirements and failure to document such
noncompliances.
8) The Failure Modes, Effects, and Critical-
ity Analysis that was conducted for the
electrical power subsystem did not consid-
er shorts as a failure mode and thus did
not reveal the presence of single point
failure modes in the subsystem nor pro-
vide a basis for the development of a full
complement of safing command se-
quences that could be used by the flight
controllers in responding to anomalies.
9) The strong desire on the part of all con-
cerned to initiate the project as soon as
possible resulted in inadequate time for
an effective Phase B study. As a result,
the project office did not have the opportu-
nity to plan the activity thoughtfully and
establish the preliminary designs, compo-
nent evaluations, test plans, and other
Phase B project plans before becoming en-
gaged in the actual spacecraft develop-
ment.
Although unrelated to the failure of the Sea-
sat, certain deficiencies in flight control pro-
cedures were present that are worthy of note
as a lesson for the future. The flight control-
lers were not provided with an adequate set
of sating command sequences to use in re-
sponse to anomalies, were not sufficiently fa-
miliar with the system they were controlling,
received insufficient anomaly training and,
during the failure event itself, failed to fol-
low the prescribed procedures in response to
the flight data available to them. Compound-
ing these difficulties were the frequent
breakdowns of the ground data acquisition
and processing system throughout the mis-
sion.
It is ironic, and yet typical, of spacecraft
failures that the termination of the Seasat
flight was caused not by a malfunction of a
new or sophisticated device, but by a failure
in a very common component of a type that
has flown in many spacecraft for many years.
It is also ironic, and instructive, that the
smallest of events or the slightest of commu-
nications could have prevented the failure.
Better clarity in an oral communication, a
brief memorandum of the right kind at the
right time, a failure report coming to the
right person, or an alert engineer could have
made all the difference.
Basic to the Seasat mission was the con-
cept of using an existing, flight-proven space-
craft bus for the services and housekeeping
functions required by the sensors in order to
minimize program costs and to permit a con-
centration of effort on the sensors and their
integration into the spacecraft. Thus the use
of a "standard Agena bus" as part of the Sea-
sat spacecraft became an enduring tenet of
the program. So firmly rooted was this prin-
ciple in program philosophy that, even after
the engineering staffs of both the govern-
ment and the contractor were well aware of
the final uniqueness of their Agena bus, the
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words, and the associated way of doing busi-
ness, persisted. They became deceived by
their own words.
Consistent with the concept of the "stan-
dard Agena bus" was the policy decision to
minimize testing and documentation, to
qualify components by similarity wherever
possible and tominimize the penetration into
the Agena bus by the government. As a re-
sult, a test was waived without proper ap-
proval, important component failures were
not reported to project management, compli-
ance with specificationswas weak, and flight
controllers were inadequately prepared for
their task. Significantly,the Seasat slipring
assembly had no applicable flighthistory at
the time of itslaunch and, in its application
to the spacecraft,was a new device.
There can, of course, be no quarrel with
the policy of using existing and well proven
equipment. The use of such equipment has
certainly reduced the costs and contributed
to the success of many space missions. But
the world of space flight is an unforgiving
one and words like "standard," "existing,"
and "similar to" can be traps for the unwary.
The technical risks of using standard equip-
ment can be as high as those present in a new
or untried piece of equipment, but the ap-
proach, both technical and managerial, must
be different.For new equipment, one designs
carefully,reviews thoroughly, and testscom-
pletely -- and that we know how to do. For
standard equipment, one should diligently
and thoroughly probe the heritage that justi-
fies the classificationand identify, compo-
nent by component and piece by piece,those
that are truly standard and those that are
not.One should assume that each space vehi-
cle is unique until proven otherwise. Then,
for those parts that are standard or well
proven, and that are applied in the same
way, one can forego design, reviews, testing
and extensive documentation. Conversely,
components that are different should be
treated as new. The policy of limited pene-
tration into Seasat's Agena bus by the gov-
ernment was appropriate, but a limited pene-
tration must be a selective penetration and
not a reduced effort everywhere.
This identification of the heritage of pre-
viously used equipment, in both design and
application, need not require a large staff or
a lot of money. But it does take time, both at
the start of the project and at the time of the
Critical Design Review. And here, respond-
ing to strong desires by all concerned to get
the project on contract and underway, the
Seasat project was denied the advantage of
an effective Phase B study. Had there been
an effective Phase B study period, prelimi-
nary designs would have been completed,
component selections better understood, test
plans and qualification requirements better
established, and possibly, the critical role
and inherent complexities of the slip ring as-
sembly might have been more apparent to
the Seasat engineering staffs. Whether such
a Phase B study period would have precluded
the Seasat failure is, of course, uncertain for
history does not reveal its alternatives. But
such a carefully conducted planning and
study period would have minimized the
chances for the type of failure that did occur.
The policy of using existing, flight-proven
equipment can be both valid and cost effec-
tive. But it is the main lesson of Seasat that
an uncritical acceptance of such classifica-
tions as "standard" can submerge important
differences from previously used equipment
in both design and in application. It is impor-
tant, therefore, that thorough planning be
conducted at the start of a project to fully
evaluate the heritage of such equipment, to
identify those that are standard and those
that are not, and to establish project plans
and procedures that enable the system to be
penetrated in a selective manner.
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